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1. Introduction 
 
The Multi-outcomes Construction Policies research project, funded by the Cooperative 
Research Centre for Construction Innovation (Project 2006-036-A), sought to explore the 
costs and benefits of leveraging social outcomes on public construction contracts. The 
context of the research project was the trend towards the contracting out of public 
construction works and the attempts that have been made to use new contractual 
arrangements with construction companies to construction achieve a wide range of social 
outcomes. In federal and state jurisdictions it is now common for governments to impose 
a range of additional requirements on public works contractors that relate to broad 
social/community objectives. These requirements include commitments to train 
apprentices and trainees; to provide local and/or indigenous employment opportunities; to 
buy local materials; and to include art works.  
 
The cost and benefits of using public construction contracts to achieve social/community 
goals have, to our knowledge, not been thoroughly researched in an Australian context. 
This is likely to reflect in large part the relatively short history of contracting out public 
works. As Jensen and Stonecash (2004) explain, most previous empirical studies of 
contracting out have attempted to measure the cost savings achieved through 
privatization, as this was the focus of policy debate in the 1980s and 1990s. Relatively 
few studies have addressed the ability of contracting arrangements to ensure the delivery 
of desired ‘quality’ outcomes1, or the costs of achieving these outcomes via contracting 
arrangements.  
 
One of the potential costs of attempting to leverage social/community outcomes on public 
construction projects is a reduction in the amount of competition for these projects, with 
obvious consequences for average bid prices and choice. In jurisdictions, such as Western 
Australia and Queensland, where currently construction market conditions are already 
                                                 
1
 A notable exception is Domberger and Jensen (1997) which explored the ability of a public authority to 
ensure adequate investments in vehicle maintenance in its contractual arrangements for the provision of 
refuse collection services 
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causing a shortfall of tenderers and rising costs, this potential competitive effect is of 
particular concern. 
 
Further costs may be involved with the inclusion of contract provisions relating to social 
outcomes. These include costs of policy development, the administration and monitoring 
of contract performance, and, for contractors, costs associated with compliance and 
reporting. 
 
The basic principles of welfare economics – and, in particular, cost-benefit analysis – 
require that the sum of the social costs of a policy intervention be justified by its 
contribution of social benefits. In the case of training policies desired benefits include an 
increased supply of skilled construction labour. In the case of local employment policies, 
improved opportunities for local enterprise and employment development are the aims. 
Indigenous employment policies seek to secure positive economic outcomes for 
indigenous communities. Percent-for-Art polices aim to increase the stock and quality of 
public art.  
 
The multi-outcomes project assembled quantitative and qualitative information on the 
various categories of costs and benefits associated with the leveraging of social outcomes 
on public construction projects. The quantitative parts of the project (summarised in the 
next section) explored the nature and extent of the competitive effects of such leveraging. 
It did so by examining the effects on the level of bid activity for public construction 
projects of two policies of the Western Australian government: the Priority Access Policy 
and the Building Skills Policy.  Both of these policies aimed at ensuring an adequate 
supply of skilled labour in the construction industry2. The Priority Access Policy, first 
implemented in August 1999, required contractors to meet a range of minimum training 
requirements3 before being eligible to tender on public building and construction 
                                                 
2
 Priority Access n.d. Retrieved October 20, 2006, from http://policies.det.wa.edu.au/; Building Skills n.d. 
Retrieved October 20, 2006, from http://policies.det.wa.edu.au/. 
3Contractors need to meet a minimum of 100 points in order for them to be able to tender. Points are 
allocated based on the contractor’s involvement in specified employment and training activities, such as 
employing apprentices and/or trainees, staff with recognised VET qualifications, staff with tertiary 
qualifications, or having staff participating in work related training programs., 
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contracts. The Building Skills Policy, which was first implemented in October 2002, 
specified that 10% of deemed labour hours be allocated to the employment of apprentices 
and/or trainees. On January 1 2007 both policies were integrated into the Priority Start – 
Building Policy. 
 
The qualitative parts of the study furnished information on stakeholder perceptions of the 
costs and benefits of key social provisions in public construction contracts. A wide range 
of contractors were interviewed as part of the study, providing detailed information on 
the magnitude and variety of costs imposed on them as a result of the social provisions. 
The contractors also provided information on the effect of the policies on, for example, 
their training or hiring decisions, thus contributing important insights to the scale of the 
benefits of the policy interventions. Policy officers in the key government agencies 
responsible for either sponsoring the policies or ensuring their implementation were also 
interviewed. This contributed important information on the rationale for the different 
policies and experiences with policy implementation. 
 
In Section 3 the results of the qualitative analysis of the costs and benefits of training 
policies are described in some detail. Section 4 summarises the details of local 
employment and indigenous employment policies in WA and Queensland, together with 
an overview of the qualitative information on costs and benefits. Concluding comments 
are made in Section 5. 
  
2. Quantitative Analysis of Training Provisions in Government 
Construction Contracts 
 
As noted in the introduction, the project’s analysis of the competitive effects of leveraged 
social outcomes focused on a particular case study: the effects of the training provisions 
inserted into contracts for Western Australian government construction contracts. The 
choice of this case study was largely motivated by the availability of suitable data. The 
WA Department of Housing and Work’s (hereafter DHW) Tender Registration System 
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was available to study the effects of the implementation of the Priority Access Policy in 
1999 and the Building Skills Policy in 2002.  
 
The Tender Registration System (TRS) was implemented in 1996 as a way of recording 
the tender details of all WA government construction projects. The TRS database 
contains records on the details of each project: a description of the works to be 
undertaken; the location of the planned work; and the estimated pre-tender value of the 
project. The database also contains information on the number of tender documents 
requested for each project, together with details on each of the tenders received and the 
winning bid. As such, the TRS is a unique and comprehensive resource for examining 
changes and variations in bid activity in an important segment of the construction 
‘market’. 
 
In the study use was made of the TRS project and tender details on 2519 government 
non-residential construction contracts awarded between 19974 and 2006. For these 
contracts 11525 tender bids were submitted. This represents close to all the contracts and 
bids included in the TRS over the ten year period. Only a very small number of contracts 
were excluded from the analysis due to incomplete recording of their details5.  
 
The analysis presented in this pat of the report is important for a number of reasons. First, 
it comprises a detailed quantitative analysis of a large set of data on public construction 
contracts. To our knowledge, little use has been made by academics of the data that now 
exists on tender bids and outcomes in most Australian jurisdictions. This research project 
hopefully highlights the potential to draw on these sources to gain greater insights into 
the trends and issues affecting the construction market in Australia.   Second, it is a novel 
attempt to examine the efficiency of using the contracting arrangements of public works 
authorities to achieve training goals. Specifically, the analysis generates unique 
information on the effects on competition for public construction contracts that may stem 
                                                 
4
 Although the TRS was initiated in 1996, records in this year were incomplete and, thus, excluded from 
our investigation 
5
 The omission of records on location and tender value appeared to be due to record keeping errors and is, 
thus, unlikely to be a source of systematic bias in the results of our analysis. 
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from different types of ‘leveraged’ training policies. The rising trend towards the 
contracting out of public sector activity, together with concerns about the availability of 
skilled labour makes this type of information of great policy relevance. 
 
The remainder of this section is organised in a straightforward manner. Section 2.1 gives 
an overview of activity in the public non-residential construction ‘market’ in WA 
generated from the TRS and other data sources. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the 
methodology used to analyse the relationship between the implementation/application of 
the Priority Access and Building Skills policies and bid activity in the public construction 
‘market’. Section 2.3 presents the results of this empirical analysis, whilst the final 
section provides a discussion and summary. 
2.1: Overview of the Non-Residential Construction Sector in WA, 
1997-2006 
 
The total value of non-residential construction activity completed in Western Australia in 
2006 was $2280m. As the following chart shows private sector work dominates this total, 
comprising close to 75% of all non-residential construction work in 2006. Public sector 
activity in 2006 was valued at $592m. 
 
The information in Figure 1 also shows the strong upward trend in non-residential 
construction work in the state from the beginning of 2002, with this increase being 
dominated by private sector activity. Between December 2001 and December 2006 the 
total nominal value of private sector work increased by 120.6%. This compared to a 3.1% 
increase between December 1996 and December 2001. 
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Figure 1: Total, Private, and Public Nominal Values for Non-Residential Construction Work done in 
Western Australia by Quarter, December 1996 to December 2006. 
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Source: Australia Bureau Statistics, 8752.0 Building Activity, Australia, Table 45. Value of Building Work by Sector, Western 
Australia: Original.  (Series Identifications: A2057722C, A2034996K, and A2046139R). 
 
It is not particularly surprising that the 1996-2007 period was also characterised by a 
sharp fall in the average number of tender bids for WA government non-residential 
construction contracts. As is shown in the following diagram, between 1997 and 2006 the 
average number of bids on these contracts fell from 5.1 to 3.3 bids, or by 35.3%. A large 
part of this change was concentrated in the years from 2001. 
 
 
Figure 2: Average Number of Tender Bids on WA Public, Non-Residential Construction Contracts 
by Year, 1997 to 2006 
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Western Australia is a large and geographically diverse state and, as such, any analysis of 
construction activity needs to take into account sizeable regional differences in costs of 
production. In the study period, the large majority (70%) of public construction contracts 
related to work undertaken in the Perth region6. A further 9% of contracts were located in 
the South West and Peel regions, both of which are relatively close to Perth. As is shown 
in Figure 3, the remaining contracts were spread across a range of remote regions.  
 
The decrease in bid numbers observed in the state as a whole also occurred in the two 
groups of regions identified here. In the regions located relatively close to Perth – that is, 
the Perth, Peel, and South West regional development regions – the average number of 
tender bids declined by 42% between 2001 and 2006. In the remaining, more remote 
regions, this decline was 35%. 
 
  
Figure 3: WA Public Non-Residential Construction Awarded Contracts by Regional Development 
Region, 1997 to 2006 (per cent) 
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Another source of diversity in public non-residential construction work in WA is the size 
of the work undertaken. Projects range from small additions to local schools to large 
                                                 
6
 This study matched the postcode information contained in the TRS with the WA Department of Land 
Information’s regional development regions6 to identify the regional distribution of contracts 
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infrastructure projects. This diversity is especially important in the context of the current 
investigation because the training policies being studied only apply to relatively large 
projects. The Priority Access Policy applies only to contracts with a pre-tender value of 
$150,000 or more; the Building Skills Policy to contracts with a pre-tender value of more 
than $2 million. 1019 contracts (or 54.2% of all awarded contracts) have been subject to 
the Priority Access Policy since its introduction in August 1999. The Building Skills 
Policy has applied to 160 contracts (or 11.8% of all awarded contracts) since its 
introduction in October 2002. Further information on the size distribution of awarded 
contracts is contained in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: WA Public Non-Residential Construction Contracts by Pre-Qualification Financial Level, 
1997 to 2006 (per cent). 
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The downward trend in tender bid numbers was common to each of the pre-qualification 
levels associated with the contracts, but it was largest in magnitude in the Level 2-4 (mid-
range) categories. This pattern is summarised in the following table.  
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Table 1: Percentage Decline in the Average Number of Tender Bids by Pre-Qualification Financial 
Level between 2001 and 2006. 
Pre-Qualification Financial Level Percentage Decline in the Average 
Number of Tender Bids 
(Level 0) - $1 to $149,000 22.9% 
(Level 1) - $150,000 to $750,000 50.2% 
(Level 2) - $750,001 to $1,500,000 56.4% 
(Level 3) - $1,500,001 to $3,000,000 60.4% 
(Level 4) - $3,000,001 to $7,500,000  56.4% 
(Level 5) - $7,500,001 and above 26.2% 
 
The observed trends in bid numbers are likely to have been strongly influenced by 
changes in factors affecting the availability of other construction work and the 
cost/availability of resources. The years since 2002 have been associated with substantial 
growth in WA’s resource and construction industries and this has produced large 
pressures on available labour and materials. 
 
A number of related statistical measures convey information on these pressures. For 
example, as is shown in the following chart, the DHW’s Building Cost Index7 there was 
only a slight rise in building costs (by around 8%) from the beginning of 1997 up to mid 
2002 but these then increased rapidly (by around 55%) to the end of 2006.  
 
                                                 
7
 for the Perth region includes both labour and material costs. 
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Figure 5: Building Cost Index for the Perth Region by Month, January 1997 to December 2006. 
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Source: The Western Australian Department of Housing and Works. Works and Building Construction Building Cost Index – Perth, 
File BB 576/87, Personal communication DHW, May 30 2007 
 
The building cost index is derived from measures of labour and materials costs and 
reflects the costs of accomplishing standard types of public and private sector 
construction projects8. The influence of labour costs on the index is apparent in the 
similar pattern of change in construction industry wages over the study period. These 
remained relatively stable between February 1996 and August 2002 (increasing by only 
1.6%). However, they rose rapidly from August 2002 onwards, increasing by 40.8% by 
November 2006 (ABS, 2006a). Materials costs rose by only 6.1% between December 
1996 and September 2002 but rose by 23.6% between the September 2002 and December 
2006 (ABS 2006b).  
 
Labour shortages emerged in the state post 2002 and were an important contributor to the 
rising wage costs. Illustrating this, the Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations skills vacancy index (DEWR n.d.), which provides a monthly indicator of the 
degree of difficulty that employers have in filling vacancies in occupations or specialised 
skill needs, recorded a 129.5% increase between the start of 2002 and the end of 2006. 
 
                                                 
8
 For example, it reports the current cost of a typical school and prison. 
  
13 
2.2: Multi-Factor Analysis of Bid Activity 
 
The central research question addressed in the study was whether the additional training 
requirements imposed as a result of the Priority Access and Building Skills policies had a 
measurable and distinct impact on bid activity for public construction contracts. That is, 
was there a measurable effect of these policies on bid numbers that was separate from the 
impacts on bid activity generated by changing economic conditions in the state? 
 
Conducting such an analysis clearly requires a multi-factor approach that is able to 
‘control’ for the influence of the range of other factors on bid numbers (such as changes 
in private construction activity and costs, as well as variations in contract region and 
project size) before focusing on the relationship between the implementation of the 
policies and bid activity. 
 
The approach adopted for this investigation was to examine variations in the number of 
tender bids for non-residential government construction contracts around the time of the 
implementation of each policy9. In the case of Priority Access policy, the analysis period 
was August 1997 to August 2001, which encompasses the 24 months prior to and the 24 
months after the implementation date of the policy. In the case of the Building Skills 
policy, the 48 month analysis period was October 2000 to October 2004.  
 
The analysis focused on differences in bid activity between the ‘market’ segments 
affected and unaffected by the policy. In the case of the Priority Access Policy this 
involved a comparison of changes in bid activity across the analysis period between a) 
projects with a pre-tender value of at least $150,000 (and thus potentially affected by the 
policy); and b) projects with a pre-tender value of less than $150,000 (not affected by the 
policy). In the case of the Building Skills Policy the two comparison groups were a) 
projects with a pre-tender value of more than $2million; and b) projects with a pre-tender 
value of $2 million or less. In each case we hypothesised that if the policies were 
                                                 
9
 This approach to restricting the time period allows us to focus more fully on the effects of the policy 
whilst allowing for the possibility of anticipatory or delayed effects 
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affecting bid activity, activity levels would have fallen in relative terms in the market 
segment affected by the policy. Furthermore, this fall would be observed in the analysis 
period. 
 
The following chart shows bid activity in the two market segments associated with the 
Priority Access policy over the analysis period. This data is clearly not supportive of the 
above hypothesis. In fact an opposite pattern is apparent: the average number of bids 
declined for contracts not subject to the Priority Access policy over the analysis period, 
whilst there was negligible change in the average number of bids for tenders subject to 
the policy.  
 
Figure 6: Average Number of Tender Bids for Contracts with a Pre-tender value < $150,000 and 
Tenders with a Pre-tender value ≥ $150,000 by Year, 1997 to 2001 
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The following chart provides information on changes in the average number of bids for 
contracts affected/not affected by the Building Skills policy between 2000 and 2004. At 
face value this data is more supportive of a hypothesis that the policy affected bid 
activity: the average number of bids for contracts subject to the policy fell at a greater 
rate than those not subject to the policy over the analysis period. There is also an apparent 
alignment between the introduction of the policy and this relative change. However, 
given the strength of the other influences on the construction market (as described in the 
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previous section), there is a need for caution before reaching firm conclusions about the 
effects of the policy. The following section provides more definitive insights. 
 
Figure 7: Average Number of Tender Bids for Tenders with a Pre-tender value ≤ $2m and Tenders 
with a Pre-tender value > $2m by Year, 2000 to 2006. 
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2.2.a: Econometric Strategy 
 
The multi-factor analysis of the relationship between bid activity and policy settings was 
structured into two parts, each relating to the key policy initiatives: Priority Access and 
Building Skills. In each part, however, the same approach was taken to the measurement 
of the effects of the policy. Specifically, linear (OLS) regression techniques were used to 
estimate the following equation, which relates to the determination of the number of bids 
for public construction contracts. 
 
           NBi = β1 + β2 PDi + β3 Zi + β4 PTi + β5RNi + β6OFi + γ2 (Zi x PDi) + εi           (1) 
 
NBi, is the number of bids submitted on contract i; PDi is a dummy variable that is based 
on the date of implementation of the policy (for example, in the case of Priority Access 
this variable takes on a value of 1 for all contracts dated after August 1999); Zi is a 
dummy variable that identifies whether the contract falls within the scope of the policy’s 
application (in the case of Priority Access this variable is coded as ‘1’ for all contracts 
with a value of $150,000 or more); PTi is a continuous measure that relates to the 
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contract’s pre-tender value; RNi is a dummy variable that identifies whether the location 
of the project was in the Perth, South-West or Peel Regions, or in another, more remote 
region. OFi is a continuous variable based on the value of the Building Cost index in the 
month that the bids were recorded. It is used in this model to proxy the level of 
competition in the construction market10. Finally, the interaction term (Zi*PDi) identifies 
those projects that were affected by the implementation of the policy (for example, in the 
case of Priority Access this variable will only take on a value of 1 for contracts with a 
pre-tender value of $150,000 or more and dated after August 1999). εi is a random error 
term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with E(εi)=0 and the var (εi)= σ2. 
 
The modelled relationship can be described in the following simplified terms. First, the 
function S, shown in the diagram below, represents the positive relationship between the 
pre-tender value of the contract and the number of bids. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 As noted in the previous section, this index reflects current costs of accomplishing the types of 
construction projects contracted for via the TRS. A variety of measures of market conditions (such as 
indexes of labour availability, materials costs, etc) are available. However, testing indicated that these are 
strongly correlated with the Building Cost Index.  
NBi 
PTi 
S 
S’ 
Z 
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The other factors in the model are hypothesised to be associated with shifts in this 
function. For example, in more remote regions the function S could be expected to shift 
downwards (implying a positive coefficient on the variable RNi in equation 1) due to the 
greater difficulties in accomplishing construction work in these areas as compared to less 
remote regions. The background statistics shown in earlier parts of this paper support this 
hypothesis. Higher building costs are likely to be associated with a downward/rightward 
shift in the function (implying a negative value on the coefficient on OFi). If the 
introduction of a training policy has a negative effect on bid activity, its application only 
to projects with a PTi ≥ Zi would cause a discontinuity in S around point Zi (as 
represented by the function S’). Evidence in support of this hypothesis would be a 
significant negative coefficient on the interactive term (Zi*PDi). The individual term PDi 
controls for the possibility (seemingly remote) that there was a change in bid activity for 
all contracts around the time of the introduction of the policy. The individual term Zi 
controls for the possibility (more likely) that there are underlying differences in the 
relationship between tender activity and pre-tender prices in the group of contracts 
‘priced’ above and below the trigger value of the policy. 
2.3: Results of Quantitative Analysis 
 
The estimated relationships between tender bid numbers and the various explanatory 
variables included in the RHS of equation 1 using DHW data are outlined in this section. 
Reflecting the above discussion, these results are presented separately for the Priority 
Access and Building Skills policies. 
  
Priority Access Policy 
Equation 1 was first estimated with reference to data on bid numbers on DHW contracts 
for the period August 1997 to August 2001. In this case Zi is defined by the introduction 
of the Priority Access Policy in August 1999 and PDi is defined by the policy’s 
application to projects with a value of $150,000 or more. 
 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: Estimated Coefficients for Equation on Bid Numbers on Government Non-Residential 
Construction Contracts (Priority Access Policy), Western Australia 1997-2001. 
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
Constant -4.2950 0.6142 
Policy Implementation Date (PD) -0.4990 0.3528 
Contract above trigger value (Z) 0.9299 0.0007 
Pre-Tender Value (PT) -1.29E-07 0.0033 
Region 1.4243 0.0000 
Building Cost Index 0.0720 0.3394 
PD*Z 0.0216 0.9612 
Notes: Log-Likelihood: 1957.8; Nobs: 789; Method: OLS 
 
The data in Table 2 indicate that the implementation of the Priority Access Policy in 
August 1999 did not have a significant effect on competition for government non-
residential construction contracts in WA. The reduction in bid numbers observed around 
the time of the implementation of this policy was similar in ‘market segments’ subject to 
the influence of the policy (i.e. contracts with a value of $150,000 or more) and in other 
parts of the ‘market’. The figures in Table 2 show, rather, that during the analysis period 
(August 1997 to August 2001) bid numbers varied between contracts firstly due to 
regional factors. The average number of bids on contracts in more remote regions was 
1.42 bids less than the number of bids on contracts in the Perth, South West and Peel 
group of regions. Bid numbers in the analysis period were also significantly affected by 
the value of the contract. Contracts with a value of $150,000 or more had, on average, 
close to 1 additional bid per contract than those with a lower pre-tender value. A 
somewhat surprising result is the lack of a statistical significant relationship between the 
building cost index and bid numbers. The most likely explanation for this is that, as was 
outlined in previous sections, the period 1997 to 2001 was a period of relatively stable 
economic conditions. There was little variation in the building cost index over the 
analysis period and, thus, this was not an important source of differences in bid activity.  
 
Building Skills Policy 
 
The results derived from the application of Equation 1 to TRS data relevant to the 
Building Skills Policy are presented in Table 3. In this case the analysis period spans 
October 2000 to October 2004; Zi is defined by the introduction of the Building Skills 
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Policy in October 2002; and PDi is defined by the policy’s application to projects with a 
value above $2 million.The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Coefficients for Equation on Bid Numbers on Government Non-Residential 
Construction Contracts (Building Skills Policy), Western Australia 2000-2004. 
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
Constant 9.3524 0.0000 
Policy Implementation Date (PD) -0.4719 0.0516 
Contract above trigger value (Z) 1.4512 0.1009 
Pre-Tender Value (PT) 1.39E-07 0.0008 
Region 1.2794 0.0000 
Building Cost Index -0.0436 0.0004 
PD*Z -1.4152 0.0986 
Notes: Log-Likelihood: 1873.5; Nobs: 807; Method: OLS 
 
The data in Table 3 provide some evidence of a negative impact of the Building Skills 
Policy on bid activity relating to government non-residential construction contracts in 
WA. Bid numbers on contracts affected by the policy (i.e. above $2 million in value and 
commencing after October 2002) were, on average, 1.42 bids lower than contracts not 
affected by the policy after 2002. However, this effect was only statistically significant at 
the 10% level. 
 
A further contrast between the results in Table 3 and those in Table 2 is the significance 
of building costs as a source of variation in bid numbers. The figures in Table 3 indicate a 
strong negative relationship between the building cost index and bid numbers. The 
difference between the results in Table 2 and 3 is likely to derive from the relatively large 
rate of change in the building cost index between 2000 and 2004, as compared to 1997-
2001.  
 
A similarity between the two sets of results is the measured importance of regional 
factors as a source of variation in bid numbers. In Table 3 the average number of bids on 
contracts in more remote regions was 1.27 bids less than the number of bids on contracts 
in the Perth, South West and Peel region. Finally, bid numbers in the analysis period 
relevant to the Building Skills Policy were positively affected by the value of the 
contract. 
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2.4: Discussion of Quantitative Results 
 
The quantitative analysis identified that the Building Skills Policy, but not the Priority 
Access Policy, affected bid activity for non-residential construction contracts in WA. Bid 
numbers were lower on contracts affected by the Building Skills Policy following the 
implementation of the Policy in October 2002. This effect was distinct from the influence 
of changes in construction costs and regional and project size factors on bid numbers. 
 
These results are significant for two key reasons. First, they indicate that the Building 
Skills Policy contributed to a lowering of competition for public construction contracts in 
the 48 month period surrounding its implementation. Such an impact has efficiency 
consequences for the public construction program, potentially contributing to higher costs 
and/or lower quality outcomes. Given that WA is currently under the influence of a range 
of economic pressures, these added costs are of particular concern. 
 
However, this conclusion does not necessarily imply that the Priority Access Policy was a 
superior training policy. It is important to ask why the Priority Access Policy did not 
affect the willingness of construction companies to bid for public projects. One possible 
answer is that it did not impose high training requirements – or affect the training actions 
of construction firms in a significant manner.  If this is the case, the evidence presented in 
this paper can not be interpreted as supportive of the policy.  
 
In sum, the results from the quantitative analysis indicate that the Building Skills Policy 
affected the actions of construction companies, causing some to avoid tendering for 
public construction contracts. These results also suggest, however, that the policy was 
effective in influencing the inclusion/exclusion of public contractors according to their 
training commitments. There is little evidence that the Priority Access Policy affected bid 
activity in the public construction ‘market’. Although this may be interpreted in the 
positive light – that is, of the policy not having negative competitive effects - it is also 
possible that the policy did not affect training outcomes on public works. The qualitative 
results, presented in the following section, cast further light on these outcomes. 
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3. Qualitative Analysis of the Training Provisions in Government 
Construction Contracts 
   
This section presents a qualitative analysis of the training policies of the Western 
Australian and Queensland governments. The analysis is based on the costs and benefits 
as perceived by the main entities affected by these policies, which include the contracting 
agencies, such as the Department of Housing and Works in WA and the Department of 
Main Roads in Queensland; sponsoring agencies, such as WA’s Department of Education 
and Training; head building contractors; and subcontractors. The section adds important 
details on the costs and benefits of training policies leveraged on public construction 
contracts and, as such, it complements the quantitative materials outlined in the previous 
section. 
 
The qualitative investigation surveyed key policy officers of the contracting and 
sponsoring agencies in each State, as well as groups of head and subcontractors. The 
contractors that participated in the study included those whose companies are currently 
engaged on public works projects, as well as those who have ceased tendering for public 
construction contracts. A range of small, medium, and large head and sub-contractors 
were surveyed in each State and from metropolitan and regional areas. The following 
paragraphs outline the general nature of the responses recorded on questions relating to 
the costs and benefits of the different policies. 
3.1 Western Australia’s Priority Access Policy  
 
Supporting the conclusions reached in the quantitative study, the transcript evidence 
relating to the Priority Access Policy indicates that it involved only negligible costs but 
also few benefits. The sponsoring agency, the Department of Education and Training 
identified only minor costs associated with processing the Priority Access application 
forms and monitoring the policy: 
“It was pretty light. Once people got their certificate and were deemed as Priority 
Access compliant that was it, there was no heavy monitoring.  We had one person 
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on it, working on Priority Access, so there weren’t a lot of resources put in it from 
our end.” (Key policy officer, DET, WA). 
 
Similarly, the contracting agency, the Department of Housing and Works, incurred few 
additional administrative costs – primarily associated with including the provisions of the 
policy in the Department’s tender and contract documentation 
“It’s not hard to write things into contracts, it’s very easy to write obligations into 
contracts”. (Key policy officer, DHW, WA). 
 
However, the DHW did raise concerns about the impacts of the Priority Access Policy on 
tender prices, expressing a belief that the Policy had created a disincentive for contractors 
to bid on government contracts. The contractors that were interviewed during the study 
did not offer any support for this proposition: claiming that the Policy had no effect on 
their willingness to bid for government contracts or on the level of their bids (more 
information on this is contained in coming paragraphs). 
 
The head and subcontractors interviewed associated the Priority Access Policy only with 
minor time costs. These costs were linked to the tasks of completing and submitting 
necessary paperwork. The Policy was not associated with any additional training costs. 
The contractors interviewed perceived that they were already compliant with the Policy 
and that the Policy was not the source of their firm’s training decision. 
 
This last observation also has relevance to the benefits of the Priority Access Policy. 
Keeping in mind that the Policy’s objective was to:  
“Increase the number of apprenticeship and traineeship opportunities for job 
seekers” (Priority Access n.d., p.3). 
 
The last comment by the contractors suggests it was not successful. Indeed this was also 
the assessment of the government agencies associated with its implementation. Key 
problems apparently related to the low training requirements of the Policy. A DET policy 
officer commented: 
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“It [the Policy’s training criteria] became so flexible over the years so that people 
just needed to show that they were committed to training, they provided work 
experience, and they employed uni-graduates, that sort of thing. It got a piece of 
cake to meet. At the end of the day I didn’t believe it added any value to the 
system other than one of perception.” 
 
A similar assessment was made by a DHW policy officer, who also highlighted some 
counter-productive elements of the Policy: 
“When they brought in Priority Access the Priority Access that we ended up with 
had no particular focus on training either apprentices or professionals or 
graduates, so providing a contractor could demonstrate training 
obligations…they became registered…There were comments made across the 
industry that ‘well now we’ve sacked all of our apprentices because we don’t need 
them’”. 
 
The contractors who participated in the study were also fully aware of the lax monitoring 
of compliance with the Policy – and apparently felt no pressure to alter their training 
decisions as a result of the Policy. 
 
Thus, consistent with the quantitative results, this part of the study concluded that the 
Priority Access Policy imposed few additional costs on the construction industry but, and 
possibly more importantly, it also resulted in few (if any) benefits. There were a number 
of problems with the Policy, which should be avoided in other attempts to achieve social 
outcomes from public construction contracts. These included, most notably, poorly 
specified policy objectives and a lack of resourcing of policy compliance. The ability of 
firms to nominate a range of expenditures on staff development clearly confused the 
policy intent and undermined efforts to monitor and enforce the Policy. The Policy is 
likely to have been more effective if it had nominated a small range of training activities 
(for example, apprentices, trainees and cadets). This would need to be complemented 
with an adequate resourcing of efforts to monitor compliance and a willingness to reject 
non-conforming bids. 
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3.2 Western Australia’s Building Skills Policy  
 
The transcript evidence on the Building Skills Policy also creates a negative impression 
of the net benefits of the policy intervention. Additional administrative costs were 
generated by the Policy; however, few tangible benefits can be identified. 
 
The sponsoring agency, the Department of Education and Training identified additional 
costs that were associated with the development and evaluation of what was, apparently, 
a ‘complex policy’. The DHW incurred some minor additional costs due to the need to 
incorporate the Policy’s provisions into standard construction contracts. However, as 
before, its primary concern was with the negative impacts of the Policy on contractors’ 
willingness to bid on government contracts. 
 
The contractors interviewed typically didn’t associate the Policy with more than 
‘nuisance level’ costs. Importantly, in the main, they didn’t link the Policy to their 
decisions about bidding on government projects. Only one of the participants in the study 
claimed he had been dissuaded from competing for government jobs because of the 
training provisions. 
 
The industry participants also typically did not link their training decisions to the 
requirements of the Building Skills Policy. As was the case for the Priority Access 
Policy, these comments also have importance for assessments of the benefits of the 
Policy`- especially as its stated objective was to: 
“ensure an adequate supply of skilled labour for current and future needs” 
(Building Skills n.d.: 3) 
 
One contractor commented that the Building Skills Policy: 
“…wouldn’t encourage me to employ apprentices. We employ apprentices 
because we employ apprentices. I’m not going to employ an apprentice just 
because I want to get a government job.”  
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The policy officers interviewed were also skeptical about the positive effects of the 
Building Skills Policy. A telling comment was made by a policy officer from the DET, 
based on his department’s own previous evaluation of the Policy: 
“The evaluation of the Building Skills Policy was not very positive, it was found 
not to have added any new apprentices, we could only find one, we could only 
identify one.” 
 
The critical reasons for this Policy’s lack of success also appear to relate to measurement 
and monitoring problems. First, once again, contractors appear to have found the Policy’s 
provisions easy to avoid (limiting compliance incentives). One contractor provided the 
following example: 
“You get a hospital say, and you’ve got a  component for the mechanical 
contractor, whose got to provide so many training hours, and he’s got a DHW 
contract with us, and he’s got  15 others with a resource company, and he’s got 
two apprentices, he shoots those two apprentices over here, and meets all his 
requirements. He hasn’t actually gone forward. You know, so that’s where the 
whole system flounders.” 
 
The sponsoring agency also apparently encountered difficulties in measuring actual 
training outcomes: 
“The Policy required that we could only count people working on the site, we 
could only count people or trades that were actually working on the sites, so you 
had your cabinetmakers and refrigeration people that didn’t count, even though 
they were doing work for that building.” 
 
In summary, the information collected in the interviews with participants in the industry 
indicates that there were few benefits generated by the Building Skills Policy. The Policy 
was not perceived by the interviewees as a significant influence on their training 
decisions. Other factors – such as confidence in future projects – were much stronger 
influences on these decisions. However, the Policy was associated with administrative 
costs for both the government agencies and, to a lesser extent, the contractors. There is 
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some evidence in the interview transcripts that these deterred some contractors from 
bidding for government contracts. To the extent that this evidence is representative of the 
response of a number of contractors across the State, the Policy can be seen to have 
reduced the pool of competitors for government contracts. This constitutes another 
important cost of the Policy. The contractors who remained interested in tendering for 
government contracts appear likely to be those who were already committed to training 
and/or were able to spread the administrative and training costs across a range of projects. 
Those who dropped out were either less committed to training or less able to meet the 
administrative and/or training costs. The incidence of training on government projects 
may have increased due to these ‘selection effects’ of the Building Skills Policy. There is 
no evidence in our transcript evidence that the Policy altered the level of training 
investment in the State. 
3.3 Queensland’s 10% Training Policy  
 
The costs associated with the 10% Training Policy appear to be of a similar magnitude 
and scope to those experienced in WA with the Building Skills Policy. That is, the size of 
the costs appears to be relatively small and relate primarily to incremental administrative 
costs. For the sponsoring agency, the Department of Education, Training and Arts 
(DETA), costs were associated primarily with the initial costs of establishing a database 
to record relevant information and the staff engaged in monitoring the Policy. For key 
contracting agencies, such as the Departments of Public Works and Main Roads, small 
costs are associated with ensuring compliance with the additional contract provisions. No 
negative impacts on competition for government contracts were perceived by these 
agencies. Supporting this, most of the contractors interviewed in the study attributed 
negligible administrative and additional training costs to the 10% Training Policy. 
 
The contractors that were interviewed also attributed only small benefits to the 10% 
Training Policy. Many of the contractors had already committed to employing 
apprentices and, as such, identified no impacts of the Policy on their decision to employ 
apprentices or trainees.  
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In contrast to these viewpoints and the opinions expressed by the policy officers in the 
WA government agencies, the Queensland government representatives were positive 
about the benefits of the 10% Training Policy. Although the Policy’s specific contribution 
to the supply of skilled labour proved hard to quantify, the officers were confident that 
the Policy had contributed to the creation of a training culture in the construction 
industry. The following extract from the interview with a representative of the 
Department of Public Works is illustrative: 
Interviewer:      “Do you think that a few of the Departments benefit from that 
Policy?” 
Policy Officer: “Yeah I suspect that we do in terms of its overall aims....to 
improve skills development and training in the industry.  Whether 
I could quote you anything on that ….it’s very subjective from 
that point of view.” 
 
One factor that may have contributed to this positive perception is the inclusion in the 
Queensland policy framework of a committee of major stakeholders affected by the 10% 
Training Policy. This is convened by the Queensland Department of Education, Training, 
and the Arts to discuss issues with the Policy and suggest ways the Policy can be 
modified to improve the efficiency of its implementation. An equivalent ‘feedback’ 
mechanism does not feature in the formal arrangements for the Building Skills Policy in 
Western Australia. 
 
As this mechanism provides industry feedback on policy design in Queensland it is likely 
to serve a positive role in communicating the objectives of the Policy, and in building 
shared commitments to training. Its absence from the policy framework in Western 
Australia may be an important omission that could be addressed in future developments 
of that State’s policy framework. 
 
Beyond this, the lack of strong evidence in either jurisdiction on the contribution of the 
policy interventions to actual training outcomes raises questions about their net benefit. 
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Both the Building Skills and 10% Training Policies contribute additional administrative 
costs and, at the margin, may discourage some firms from bidding for government 
projects. Firms that do perform government work may, ultimately, be those committed to 
training. As noted above, this may indicate that the Policies have ‘selection effects’ – in 
that government work becomes concentrated in the hands of firms who already share the 
government’s commitments to training. However, it appears that the Policies do not 
encourage government contractors to increase their investments in training. Furthermore, 
especially in times when non-government is easily available, the Policies do not influence 
the training decisions of the (much larger) group of firms engaged in non-government 
work. As such, there appear to be important reasons to reconsider the design of these 
policy interventions. 
4. Other Multi-Outcome Policies 
 
This section provides an overview of the differences and similarities in the objectives and 
implementation frameworks of the employment policies applying to public construction 
projects in Western Australia and Queensland. These policies include those directed 
towards indigenous employment and local employment and/or economic development. 
4.1 Indigenous Employment Policies 
 
The two jurisdictions approach the promotion of indigenous employment and economic 
opportunity through their public works contracts in quite different ways. The Aboriginal 
Enterprise and Employment Tendering Preference Policy (Western Australia) is a 
tendering price preference policy, where as the Indigenous Employment Policy 
(Queensland) is a post-tender policy that applies to specific indigenous communities 
within Queensland. As such, the WA policy delivers potential benefits to construction 
companies that are already either owned by indigenous people or that currently employ 
indigenous workers. In contrast, the Queensland policy potentially improves employment 
and training opportunities for indigenous people in non-indigenous construction 
companies and/or companies that do not currently employ indigenous workers. A further 
important difference between the two indigenous employment policies is that the 
Queensland policy specifically targets employment and training opportunities in 
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particular communities, whereas the WA policy has no such focus. The table on the 
following page summarises the features of the two policies. 
 
The qualitative evidence gathered on the costs and benefits of these policies, was limited 
by the scope and scale of the multi-outcomes project. Indeed, one of the 
recommendations of the study for a detailed, dedicated study of these particular policy 
interventions.  
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Table 4: Indigenous Employment Policy Objectives and Implementation Frameworks 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND 
The Aboriginal Enterprise & Employment Tendering 
Preference Policy 
  
 The Indigenous Employment Policy for Queensland 
Government Building and Civil Construction Projects (IEP)  
Objectives The objective of the Aboriginal Enterprise 
and Employment strategy is to increase the 
number of Aboriginal owned and operated 
enterprises, or enterprises that employ 
Aboriginal people, that supply government 
agencies. 
Objectives The Indigenous Employment Policy has the 
stated objective of maximising: 
“…. the potential employment opportunities on 
Queensland Government building and civil 
construction projects and address skills 
shortages in Indigenous communities. It also 
aims to build Indigenous capacity to 
participate in building and civil 
construction.” (IEP, n.d., p.2) 
Policy Trigger 
Value 
All State Government building and 
construction contracts. 
Policy Trigger 
Value 
All State Government building and 
construction contracts in specified Indigenous 
communities with a total contract value 
exceeding $100,000 for building or civil 
construction contracts of any value. 
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Implementation 
Time 
Tender evaluation. Implementation 
Time 
Post-tender. 
Quantity 
Requirements 
The policy has been implemented through the 
use of a tendering preference. The tendering 
preference is calculated as 10% of the tender 
amount, with the maximum tendering 
preference being set at $100,000. The 
preference amount depends on whether the 
organisation employs indigenous people or is 
an indigenous enterprise.  
 
Quantity 
Requirements 
The policy replaces the 10% Training Policy in 
specified indigenous communities. The quantity 
requirements in the policy require that a 
minimum of 20% of the deemed labour hours 
be undertaken by indigenous people recruited 
from the local community, with half of the 20% 
of labour hours to be in accredited training. 
Quality 
Controls 
None. Quality 
Controls 
None. 
Responsible 
Entity 
Tenderer Responsible 
Entity 
Contractors and/or subcontractors. 
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The qualitative information gathered on the Aboriginal Enterprise and Employment 
Tendering Preference Policy indicates that it has had little to no effect. For example, data 
provided in a personal communication by a policy officer at the Department of Housing 
and Works, indicate that the Policy has only affected the awarding of one contract out of 
seventy (or 1.43% of contracts that included bids from indigenous enterprises).  
 
The Queensland Indigenous Employment Policy appears to be associated with a 
relatively large commitment of government resources (primarily by the sponsoring 
agency, the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations) and more substantial 
benefits. Some indication of these benefits is provided in the following communication 
from a policy officer at DEIR: 
“Available data from January 2006 to 30 June 2006 indicates that 410 jobs were 
created through the IEP (20% Policy) on 23 building construction projects and 
43 civil construction projects.  It is expected that this figure would be higher if all 
agencies strengthened the reporting compliance obligations in their contracts 
with successful tenderers.” 
 
Against this, concerns were raised by some study participants about the possible transient 
nature of the employment and training opportunities created by the Policy. Contractors 
also referred to some costs associated with the Policy, especially those due to the 
employment of relatively low-skilled labour. Commitment to the objectives of the 
scheme by contractors and indigenous communities were identified as vital components 
of its success. 
 
4.2 Local Employment Policies 
 
There are currently substantial differences between the Queensland and WA approach to 
the promotion of local employment/enterprise via state government construction 
contracts. The WA Buy Local Policy is based on a tendering price preference scheme 
whereas the Queensland Local Industry Policy is based on identifying potential local 
suppliers and disseminating information to local contractors and subcontractors about 
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forthcoming construction projects. As such, the Queensland approach avoids a limitation 
of the price preference approach, that it is negated by the Australian and New Zealand 
Procurement Agreement when a tender is submitted from either another state in Australia 
or from New Zealand.  
  
The Local Industry Policy is also implemented much earlier in the life-cycle of 
construction projects than the Buy Local Policy. Specifically, it comes into operation in 
the planning/pre-tender stage of a project, whereas the Buy Local policy is not 
implemented until the tendering stage of a project. The Queensland approach features a 
role for the Industry Capability Network in gathering, providing, and/or disseminating 
information to project proponents on the capabilities and competitiveness of local 
suppliers. This proactive approach to involving local suppliers in state construction 
projects in not evident in the WA approach.  
 
The Local Industry Policy, unlike the Buy Local Policy, also adopts a focused approach 
to the pursuit of local employment opportunities. The Policy is only applied to 
construction projects when benefits are anticipated. Projects that, for example, by their 
nature already contain high levels of local content are exempted from the Policy. This 
provides a mechanism whereby the administrative and other costs of the Policy’s 
imposition can be weighed against potential benefits.  
 
The Local Industry Policy also features a flexible approach to the definition of the local 
area, which is not evident in the WA Buy Local Policy.  In the Queensland policy, the 
prescribed distance from the contract location is based on the existence of a competitive 
pool of tenderers, whereas in the WA policy the prescribed distance from the contract 
location is fixed. This difference between the policies is likely to affect the policies’ 
respective impacts on the competitiveness of the tendering process and, potentially, 
contract prices. The details of the two Policies are summarised in the following table. 
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Table 5: Local Employment Policy Objectives and Implementation Frameworks 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND 
Buy Local Policy  Local Industry Policy  
Policy  
Objectives 
The stated objective of the Buy Local Policy 
is ‘To maximise supply opportunities for 
competitive local Western Australian 
businesses when bidding for State government 
contracts’ (Buy Local Policy 2002, p.1).  The 
Policy’s specific aims include: increasing 
local contracting opportunities, facilitating 
sustainable local business employment 
growth, maximising industry development 
potential, stimulating competition, and 
ensuring that government agencies’ 
purchasing decisions are based on best value 
for money. 
Policy  
Objectives 
The preamble to the Local Industry Policy also 
implies objectives relating to maximizing local 
employment: 
“Whilst recognising that investment 
decisions are made in a competitive 
global market, it is desirable to 
achieve the maximum level of local 
content in goods, services and labour 
where these are competitive as to 
price, quality, and delivery 
requirements.” (“Local Industry 
Policy” n.d., p.2) 
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Policy Trigger 
Conditions 
A “local content” selection criterion is applied 
to the evaluation of state government tenders 
that have an estimated contract value of 
$750,000 or above. 
Policy Trigger  
Conditions 
Queensland government funded projects with 
a value greater than $5 million or major 
projects where the Queensland government 
has provided a significant contribution ( i.e. 
the Queensland government has made a total 
financial contribution with a value greater than 
$2.5 million).  
 
Implementation 
Time 
Tender Evaluation. Implementation 
Time 
Pre-tender. 
Quantity 
Requirements 
Two Regional Price Preference schemes 
apply: the Regional Business Preference 
scheme; and the Regional Content Preference 
scheme. The Regional Business Preference 
scheme provides businesses that are located 
within a prescribed distance from a contract 
point with a price preference that applies to 
their total tender bid. When assessing tender 
bids, the scheme allows government agencies 
to reduce the value of total tender bids of 
Quantity 
Requirements 
The preparation of a Local Industry 
Participation Plan. 
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eligible businesses by a specified percentage. 
For the assessment of goods and services 
purchase or contract tenders, the total tender 
bid is reduced by 10%, up to a maximum 
reduction of $50,000, and for the assessment 
of housing and works purchase or contract 
tenders, the total tender bid is reduced by 5%, 
up to a maximum of $50,000.  
 
The Regional Content Preference provides 
businesses located beyond a prescribe 
distance from a contract point with a price 
preference that applies to the total cost of 
goods and services purchased from businesses 
within a prescribed distance from a contract 
point. When assessing tender bids, the 
regional content price preference scheme 
allows government agencies to reduce the 
value of the total cost of goods and services 
purchased from businesses within a 
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prescribed distance from a contract point by a 
specified percentage. For the assessment of 
goods and services purchase or contract 
tenders , the total cost of goods and services 
purchased from businesses within a 
prescribed distance from a contract point is 
reduced by 10%, up to a maximum reduction 
of $50,000. For the assessment of housing and 
works purchase or contract tenders, the total 
cost of goods and services purchased from 
businesses within a prescribed distance from a 
contract point is reduced by 5%, up to a 
maximum of $50,000.  
Quality 
Controls 
Not applicable. Quality 
Controls 
Not applicable. 
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The transcript evidence on the costs and benefits of the WA Buy Local Policy generally 
follows a similar pattern to that established in the discussion of the State’s training 
policies. That is, the Policy was generally perceived as imposing small additional 
administrative costs but also as generating few benefits. In addition, the Buy Local Policy 
is perceived by some in the industry as producing substantial anti-competitive effects. 
 
Administrative costs were associated for contracting agencies, such as the Department of 
Main Roads, as a result of the imposition of a more complicated project assessment 
process. However, for this Department at least, the process did not result in a substantial 
change in the decisions made on tenders; largely due to the relatively low value of the 
price preference in relation to the size of most projects. 
 
The transcript evidence from the interviews with contractors suggests that the Buy Local 
Policy has substantial anti-competitive effects. To the extent that this limited sample is 
representative of the relevant section of the industry, this is likely to have raised the cost 
of construction projects in remote or regional areas, but may have, via the protection 
afforded to local firms, encouraged local employment. 
 
One of the head contractors interviewed thought that the Buy Local Policy acted as a 
negative incentive for ‘external’ (non-local) companies to bid on government contracts in 
particular areas. His assessment was that non-local firms were placed at a 5% to 10% 
disadvantage and that this reduced the number of bids for contracts subject to the Policy. 
His own company had stopped bidding on regional contracts subject to the Buy Local 
Policy because of a perception that it gave local contractors an unfair advantage. 
 
Another head contractor that we interviewed asserted that the Policy produced further 
inefficiencies. Specifically, he believed that local builders should be able to put in 
cheaper bid prices for local projects because they don’t have to pay travel and 
accommodation expenses. By further reducing the competitiveness of external bidders, 
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the Policy presumably reduces the pressure on local builders to reflect these cost 
advantages in their tender bids. 
 
Another interviewee alleged additionally that the Buy Local Policy was subject to 
widespread rorting, with companies falsely claiming they have a business located and 
operating in the area. He gave the example of a company claiming they had a business 
located and operating in a local area when in fact they only had a shed without any 
facilities. This interviewee also claimed that there is no monitoring or validation of values 
claimed against the Buy Local Policy. This is likely to cause the benefits of the Policy to 
be overstated. 
“We had a project that was in … for ten or twelve houses, and a builder, I won’t 
give you his name, he had a so called registered office in …and he was going to 
turnaround and workout of that office. That office in … was a shed. He didn’t 
have anyone up there, he didn’t have a phone up there, he didn’t turnaround and 
have anything up there.” 
 
The Queensland Local Industry Policy appears to have also generated small additional 
administrative costs. However, concerns about these costs and the Policy’s potential anti-
competitive effects appear to have been mitigated by the flexible approach adopted to the 
Policy’s implementation.  
 
Administrative costs have been associated with the development of the Local Industry 
Policy and with the operation of the ICN. However, the application of the Policy only to 
projects that are likely to generate substantial local benefits has, apparently generated cost 
savings, as is reflected in the following comment (made by a policy officer from the 
Department of State Development): 
“If you are putting up a $5 million school out in Longreach or somewhere like 
that, it’s going to be all Bessablock and it’s all going to be local.… So do we 
really want to go chasing that? And the answer is no, because it was putting an 
imposition on agencies to do something that wasn’t going to make a difference.” 
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The impact of the Policy on contracting costs also appears to have been limited by the 
flexible approach that has been adopted to the definition of ‘local’. This is done with 
reference to the existence of a competitive pool of tenderers – rather than a fixed 
geographical distance. This helps to ensure that, even in the presence of the Policy, 
sufficient bids are received for government construction contracts.  
  
5. Concluding Comments 
 
The evidence that has been compiled on the leveraging of social outcomes on public 
construction projects raises substantial concerns about the net social benefits of many 
current interventions. Several interventions appear to involve a ‘light’ approach to the 
imposition of training or employment obligations on contractors. As such, they have the 
advantage of keeping administrative and additional contracting costs to a minimum. 
However, the positive impacts of the policy interventions on training and employment 
outcomes also appear to have been very small. 
 
The comparison of the policy approaches adopted in Queensland and WA has yielded 
some insights into possible improvements. The positive assessment of the impact of the 
committee established to provide industry feedback on the 10% Training Policy in 
Queensland indicates that structures of this type could be important innovations in other 
jurisdictions and for other policies. The higher level of resourcing of Indigenous 
Employment Policies in Queensland – together with the adoption of employment and 
training targets for specific indigenous communities – appears to have been much more 
successful than the WA approach, based on tender preference. The resourcing of the 
Industry Capability Network in Queensland - together with the adoption of a flexible 
approach to the application of the Local Employment Policy – appears to have avoided 
many of the problems experienced with the WA Buy Local Policy.  
 
Generally, however, the project has highlighted that in the absence of strong industry 
commitment to policy objectives, policy interventions are likely to result in high levels of 
avoidance activity, substantial administrative costs and very few benefits. Thus, for 
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policy action on, for example, training or local employment to be successful, compliance 
issues must be adequately addressed.  
 
Currently it appears that pre-qualification schemes (similar to the Priority Access 
Scheme) and schemes that rely on measuring, for example, the training investments of 
contractors within particular projects do not achieve high levels of compliance and 
involve significant administrative costs. Alternatives need to be developed to these 
policies. One possibility is a levy on each public construction project – set as a proportion 
of the total project costs. Although a full evaluation of this policy alternative was beyond 
the scope of the multi-outcomes construction policies project, it appears to offer the 
potential to minimize the transaction costs on contractors whilst enabling the creation of a 
training agency dedicated to improving the supply of skilled construction labour. A 
recommendation is thus made that this policy alternative be fully researched and 
evaluated. 
 
The outcomes of the multi-outcomes research project also highlight the need for 
sensitivity to project circumstances in the development and implementation of polices for 
public construction projects. Ideally a policy framework would have the flexibility to 
respond to circumstances where contractors share a commitment to the policy objectives 
and are able to identify measurable social outcomes from the particular government 
projects they are involved in. This would involve a project-by-project negotiation of goals 
and performance measures. It is likely to only be practical for large, longer term projects.  
 
As a final observation, the multi-outcomes project has also shown the potential for policy 
development in each State to be informed by the experiences of other jurisdictions. As 
Queensland and Western Australia share many similar economic and other 
characteristics, and have very similar social and economic goals, this potential is 
especially large. Thus, it can be expected that there will be ongoing collaborations 
between the State governments on research aimed at further improving training and 
employment outcomes via public construction projects. 
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